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THOMAS L. FORD*
In order to insure continuity, the author has endeavored to follow
the pattern established by previous survey articles. The emphasis once
again is placed upon factual patterns and procedural problems rather
than upon analytical comparisons of the cases, except in cases of patent
conflict.'
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I. AUTOMOBILE CASES
A. The Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine
The Florida dangerous instrumentality doctrine was borrowed from
the law of agency and adapted to tort law. Liability is imposed upon
* Member of Florida Bar; formerly Managing Editor of the University of Miami Law
Review (Vol. XVIII).
1. The material covered is from the cases reported in the Southern Reporter, second
series, volumes 133 through 155 and in the Federal Reporter, second series, volumes 294
through 322.
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the owner of an automobile or other vehicle for injuries which occur as
the result of the negligent operation of the vehicle by anyone who operates
it with the owner's consent or authorization.
In Fry v. Robinson Printers, Inc.,2 the defendant owner left his auto-
mobile at a service station for minor repairs and servicing. The plaintiff
was injured when the car was negligently operated by a fellow employee
as he attempted to guide the vehicle onto a grease rack. A summary judg-
ment entered in favor of the defendant was affirmed. Since both employ-
ees were engaged in servicing the automobile, the owner of the automobile
was not liable solely by reason of ownership for its negligent operation
by one employee resulting in injury to another.
Illegal use of a dealer's tag was held to be insufficient in itself to ex-
tend liability to the dealer.3 The dealer furnished one of its tags to a sales-
man for his unrestricted use on a demonstrator which was owned by
the salesman. After the salesman had left a company Christmas party and
while he was delivering Christmas presents to friends, an accident oc-
curred, in which the plaintiff's wife and child were killed. In affirming a
summary judgment entered in favor of the dealer, the court held that
the salesman was not within the scope of his employment at the time
the accident occurred' and the plaintiff's contention that the dealer was
estopped to deny ownership was rejected.5 Extension of liability predi-
cated upon illegal use of a dealer's tag was held to be a matter of legis-
lative concern.6
In Florida, by statute,7 the owner of a motor vehicle is presumed Ii-
2. 155. So.2d 645 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963). The defendant-appellee-operator testified that upon
the plaintiffs' signal to stop he put his foot on the brake but it slipped off and hit the gas
pedal. The car then lurched forward, jumped the safety barrier on the lift and struck the
plaintiff, pinning him against some oil cans.
3. Nichols v. McGraw, 152 So.2d 486 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
4. "[T]he real issue confronting the trial judge was whether or not McGraw while
operating his automobile had abandoned the business of his master and was at the time
pursuing his own personal mission. We agree with the trial judge . . . . [Ilt is undisputed
that McGraw . . . left his employer's place of business and from that time was going on
a frolic of his own. . . "Id. at 490.
5. ". . .the law of this jurisdiction imposes liability upon the owner of an automobile
either by virtue of actual ownership of same, or by facts and circumstances precluding one
exercising such dominion over the vehicle from denying ownership." Id. at 492. The plain-
tiff contended that the facts that McGraw was required to purchase a new automobile,
that the demonstrators were sold to salesman at cost (and with very favorable finance plans
not available to the general public), and that the salesman was given unrestricted use of the
tag, constituted an estoppel on the dealer's part to deny ownership. The court rejected the
argument: "The facts and circumstances . . . fall far short of meeting the estoppel re-
quirement and . . . the record is conclusive that the motor company did not have actual
ownership of the automobile in question." Id. at 492.
6. See FLA. STAT. § 320.13 (1963), which provides that dealers' tags are lawfully usable
only on "motor vehicles owned by the dealer to whom such tag was issued" and while being
operated in connection with such dealers' business. Wolfe v. City of Miami, 103 Fla. 774,
137 So. 892 (1931); Lambert v. Johnson, 109 So.2d 187 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1959) (Use of
dealers' tag does not per se render the licensee liable in tort).
7. FLA. STAT. § 51.12 (1963).
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able for the negligent acts of a driver upon proof by the plaintiff of the
defendant's ownership of the vehicle and the indentification of the driver
of the vehicle. The presumption is rebuttable and vanishes when uncon-
tradicted evidence shows that the driver was operating the vehicle without
the owner's consent.' In Hudson v. Smith,9 the plaintiff elected to place
the driver-employee of the defendant on the stand to prove up the pre-
sumption. The driver's testimony showed that he was not authorized to
use the truck in question and actually had been refused permission to
use the truck.'" On appeal, a directed verdict for the defendant owner
was affirmed, since the driver's testimony rebutted the effect of the stat-
utory presumption and left the plaintiff without proof as to the authority
of the driver to use his employer's truck at the time the accident oc-
curred.
In Stettler v. Huggins," the defendant owners entrusted their auto-
mobile to one John Felton Dean and authorized him to drive it from Rich-
mond, Virginia, to Miami. After arrival the car was involved in an accid-
ent with the plaintiff's automobile. The driver was thrown from the car,
rendered unconscious and remained in that condition until some time after
hospitalization. The plaintiff attempted to introduce evidence to establish
the identity of the driver by way of a Florida driver's license found
in the driver's wallet by the investigating officer at the scene of the ac-
cident. The license was issued to a John Felton Dean. Hospital records
were also proffered to show that the driver was admitted and carried on
the records as "John Dean." The trial court sustained the defendant's
objection to the admission of the evidence and directed a verdict for the
defendant owners on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to show
that the driver of the defendant's car was the man to whom the vehicle
was entrusted. On appeal the decision was reversed and remanded for a
new trial on the grounds, inter alia, that any uncertainty as to identify-
ing evidence and the method of identification goes to the weight of the
evidence rather than to its admissibility. 2
In a case of first impression," the federal court of appeals for the
fifth circuit held that the Florida dangerous instrumentality doctrine
was applicable only in a tort action, and not in an action ex contractu.
8. Johnson v. Mills, 37 So.2d 906 (Fla. 1948).
9. 135 So.2d 450 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
10. "Q. But it (the trunk) hadn't been entrusted to you to take home?
A. Oh, no, no sir." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 451.
11. 134 So.2d 534 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
12. Evidence offered on an issue of identity . . . to be admissible, need not in itself
constitute clear or irrefutable proof. Any fact which in the course of ordinary
affairs tends to satisfy a person of average judgment as to the identity of an in-
dividual is admissible as evidence bearing on that issue. Of course . . . a driver's
license could be stolen . . . forged or altered. . . . But a driver's license . . .
generally is regarded as reliable evidence of ... identity in everyday business trans-
actions .. .. Id. at 535.
13. Heilmann v. Hertz Corp., 306 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1962).
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The plaintiffs were injured in an accident in Georgia between their car and
a truck owned by the defendant and leased to a Florida corporation. The
plaintiffs first brought suit in a state court in Florida 14 against the lessee's
driver and the lessor. The suit was dismissed as to 'the lessor because he
could not be a party under Georgia law and as to the lessee's driver on
the ground that the action was barred by the Georgia statute of limita-
tions.1" The plaintiffs -then filed suit in the federal district court in Florida
alleging an action in tort and contract. The complaint was dismissed on
the grounds that the action, although alleging grounds in contract was
one which sounded in tort and was barred by the Georgia statute of limi-
tations. The plaintiffs sought to recover in contract under the Florida dan-
gerous instrumentality doctrine on the basis that they were third party
beneficiaries of the rental contract.' 6 The court rejected this theory, hold-
ing that "the dangerous instrumentality doctrine has been applied only
in tort actions by the Florida Supreme Court and it is not within our prov-
ince to hold that this doctrine is also applicable to civil actions brought
under contracts .... ,17
A "tow-motor" was held to be a motor vehicle and the doctrine prop-
erly applied in Eagle Stevedores, Inc. v. Thomas.'
B. The Guest Statute19
The significant cases under the guest statute relate primarily to the
sufficiency of allegations of fact in the complaint to constitute gross neg-
ligence and a determination of the status of the plaintiff as a guest.
In Leibowitz v. Franklin,2" the complaint alleged that the plaintiff
suffered injuries when the car in which she was riding was the offending
vehicle in a rear end collision. A judgment entered upon a motion to dis-
miss, plus the plaintiff's refusal to plead further, was affirmed on the
grounds that the allegations of fact were inadequate to state a cause
of action. 21
14 Heilmann v. Wilson, 129 So.2d 725 (Fla. 1st Dist.) cert. denied, 135 So.2d 741 (Fla.
1961).
15. GA. CODE § 3-1004 (1856). In Florida see FLA. STAT. § 95.10 (1963).
16. Plaintiff relied upon a Connecticut decision, Levy v. Daniels U-Drive Auto Renting
Co., Inc., 188 Conn. 333, 143 At. 163 (1928), which held that a Connecticut statute im-
posing liability upon any person renting or leasing a motor vehicle to another for damage
to persons or property while so rented or leased, followed the vehicle wherever it was
driven and the statute was applicable in an accident which occurred outside the state of
Connecticut.
17. Heilmann v. Hertz Corp, supra note 13, at 102.
18. 145 So.2d 551 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
19. FLA. STAT. § 320.59 (1963).
20. 136 So.2d 260 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
21. Gross negligence: that degree of negligence which lies in the area between
ordinary negligence and wilful and wanton misconduct; that course of conduct
which a reasonable and prudent man would know would probably and most likely
result in injury to persons or property; that course of conduct such that the likeli-
hood of injury to other persons or property is known by the actor to be imminent
or clear and present. Carraway v. Revell, 116 So.2d 16, 22, 23 (Fla. 1959).
1964]
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In a similar case involving a rear end collision, the passenger alleged
in an amended complaint that the defendant drove at an excessive rate
of speed at a time when the streets had become inundated by a torrential
rain exceeding six inches. 2 As a result, the defendant knew or should
have known that the brakes of the vehicle were wet and inoperative. 23
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it failed to
allege sufficient facts to constitute gross negligence. On appeal, the case
was reversed and remanded for trial. The appellate court held that when
it appears that the question of whether the complaint states a cause of
action under the guest statute is a close one on which honest men could
differ, the case should be submitted to a jury. 4
In Fleming v. Smart,25 the parties were proceeding in the defendant's
car from a cafe to a church sale. Enroute, the plaintiff was driving and
stopped to assist a stalled motorist. Both went to the rear of the defend-
ant's car. The defendant then entered his car, started it, and through some
unexplained maneuver, caused it to back up and strike the plaintiff,
breaking both of his legs. Since the plaintiff did not allege gross negli-
gence, a summary judgment for the defendant was affirmed. The plaintiff
was clearly a guest and the injuries occurred before the contemplated trip
was completed.
One major exception to the guest statute occurs when the motivating
purpose of the transportation is the mutual benefit of the parties or for
the sole benefit of the owner or driver.26 The benefit, however, must be
real and not remote, vague, or incidental.2"
In England v. Stauffer,2" the plaintiff was thrown from the rear of
a pick-up truck due to-the driver's negligence. At the time, :the parties
were engaged in supervising the coaching of their club's drill team. The
plaintiff contended that the drill team, at certain times, participated in
fund raising activities for charitable purposes and that this fact estab-
lished a sufficient mutual interest to take the case out of the statute.2 9
22. Martin v. Clum, 142 So.2d 149 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
23. The circumstances of each case determine whether the operator of an automobile is
guilty of gross negligence or wanton and willful misconduct as contemplated by the guest
statute. Every act of commission or omission which concerns the accident must be con-
sidered and the course of conduct complained of must be of such character that the
operator of the automobile knew or should have known that it would place others in
danger of injury. Hall v. Hughey, 104 So.2d 849, 851 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958). See also Koger v.
Hollahan, 144 Fla. 779, 198 So. 685 (1940) ; see also Dexter v. Green, 55 So.2d 548 (Fla. 1951).
24. See Thompson v. Bennett, 42 So.2d 583 (Fla. 1949).
25. 153 So.2d 748 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963). See also Fishback v. Yale, 85 So.2d 142 (Fla.
1955).
26. Sullivan v. Stock, 98 So.2d 507 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1957).
27. "A remote, vague, or incidental benefit is not sufficient. Nor . . . where . .
[the] journey or ride is for purposes of companionship, pleasure, social amenities, hos-
pitality, and the like." Id. at 510.
28. 145 So.2d 545 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
29. The particular parade being rehearsed was not for a charitable purpose.
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A summary judgment for the defendant was affirmed. Stressing the point
that each case must be determined on its own facts, the court held that
"the mutual interests which the parties may have had in serving as mem-
bers of an organization which on other occasions raised charity funds
did not produce for the ... driver tangible benefits sufficient to bring
the plaintiff within the claimed exception to the guest statute. 3 °
Similarly, no sole or mutual benefit was found in Travis v. Black-
mon,"l in which the plaintiff-passenger was injured while en route to a
cemetery after, at the defendant's -request, he gratuitously read the obit-
uary of a decedent at a funeral home.32 The nature of the service per-
formed was held to be merely a social amenity or gesture of hospitality
and thus insufficient to remove plaintiff from the status of a guest.
In Bramble v. Garris,33 the plaintiff's husband was killed when the
automobile driven by the defendant ran a stop sign and was struck by a
trailer truck. Both the driver and the passenger were officers and stock-
holders of a close corporation and were making a periodic inspection trip
to the corporate offices. A summary judgment for the defendant was
reversed, since an issue of fact existed as to whether a business relation-
ship and purpose existed which was sufficient to take the case outside the
statute.
Another major exception to the guest statute is the commercial pas-
senger.34 The fact that a guest agrees to pay a share of the expenses, how-
ever, is not necessarily construed as compensation or payment for ser-
vices; rather, it is usually considered a mere act of courtesy.
In Minnick v. Keene, 5 the dismissal by the trial court was affirmed
when the court held that a complaint which merely alleged the de-
fendant's agreement to take the plaintiff on a trip in consideration of
plaintiff's paying certain expenses was insufficient to allege a non-guest
status. Thus the plaintiff's remedy, if any, was under the guest statute,
to which she declined to resort by failing ,to amend her complaint.
Similarly, in McGowan v. Wilson,36 the fact that two carpenters
agreed to take a trip in search of employment and that it was assumed
30. Supra note 28, at 549.
31. 155 So.2d 698 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
32. The decedent was the defendant's niece and the plaintiff's beautician.
33. 144 So.2d 324 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962). See also Sproule v. Nelson, 81 So.2d 478 (Fla.
1955); Handsel v. Handsel, 72 So.2d 813 (Fla. 1954) ; Perry v. Mershon, 149 Fla. 351,
5 So.2d 694 (1942); Tillman v. McLeod, 124 So.2d 135 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960); Sullivan v.
Stock, 98 So.2d 507 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1957). But see, Berne v. Peterson, 113 So.2d 718 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1959). See generally: 59 A.L.R. 336 (1929); 4 BLAsHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTO-
MOBILE LAW AND PROCEDURE, 2291-92 (1935).
34. Yokom v. Rodriguez, 41 So.2d 446 (Fla. 1949); McDougald v. Couey, 150 Fla.
748, 9 So.2d 187 (1942).
35. 139 So.2d 172 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
36. 154 So.2d 331 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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from previous trips that the plaintiff would pay his fair share of ex-
penses was not sufficient to establish the mutual benefit exception to the
guest statute. "[T]he trip was made at 'the plaintiff's suggestion and for
his own benefit. While the defendant also benefited .. . this benefit was
only incidental, remote, and vague.
'8 7
In another case,88 the court thoroughly reviewed the issue of the
sufficiency of 'the evidence upon which to base an instruction to the jury
on "unavoidable accident."8 The plaintiff's wife was killed when the car
in which she was riding with a friend crossed over into the opposite travel
lane into the path of an oncoming vehicle. The defendant testified that
she was traveling at a speed of about thirty-five to forty miles per hour.
As the traffic in front of her came to a stop, she applied her brakes, started
skidding, felt a pull to the left and then skidded over into the opposite
lane. No evidence was introduced to prove that any mechanical failure
caused the jerk or pull to the left, and other witnesses estimated the de-
fendant's speed at sixty to sixty-five miles per hour. The trial court in-
structed the jury on the theory of unavoidable accident. A verdict was
rendered for the defendant. In reversing and remanding the case for a new
trial, the appellate court reasoned that in order for the jury to conclude
that the death resulted from an unavoidable accident it would have been
necessary to indulge in the inference that the pull or jerk of the vehicle to
the left was the result of an unknown cause over which the defendant
had no control, and in -the further inference that this resulted in an un-
controllable skid. "[T]he jury cannot base inference upon inference in
order to arrive at a conclusion of fact. While negligence, as well as the
manner in which an accident occurred, may be inferred from known or
established facts . . the ultimate conclusion cannot be conjectured from
other inferences."40 Thus, the giving of such an instruction was prejudicial
error in that it tended to mislead and confuse the jury.
In Perdue v. Watson, the plaintiff missed 'his flight to Sarasota.
He then met the defendant in the airport bar and upon learning that the
latter was driving to Sarasota, offered him ten dollars for transportation
to that city. En route, the defendant driver negligently drove over a severe
dip in the road, causing an injury to the plaintiff's neck and back. There-
37. Id. at 333.
38. Sirmons v. Pittman, 138 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
39. The doctrine of unavoidable accident is applicable only when under some theory
of the case the injury does not result from the negligence of either party. The casualty
must be produced by some unavoidable cause. It is actually somewhat of a misnomer,
since in such a case the element of proximate cause is lacking in that there is no causal
relationship between the acts and the damages sustained. E.g., Carr v. Boyd, 123 Colo. 350,
229 P.2d 659 (1951) ; Iacino v. Brown, 121 Colo. 450, 217 P.2d 266 (1950) ; Harper v. Hall,
76 Ga. 441, 46 S.E.2d 201 (1948); Kelly v. Employers Cas. Co., 202 Okla. 437, 214 P.2d
925 (1950); Bailey v. Woodrum Truck Lines, 36 S.W.2d 1090 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930), aff'd,
57 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. Com. App. 1933). For a general discussion of the doctrine, see 10C
BLASHFIELD, AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 6698 (1935).
40. Supra note 38, at 770.
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after, they stopped at a gas station at which time the plaintiff gave the de-
fendant five dollars. The defendant testified that he never accepted money
for -transportation and did not remember discussing any agreed price for it.
In affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, the court held that the facts
were sufficient to submit the case to the jury on an issue of ordinary negli-
gence. Since the parties were strangers and the journey was not for the
purpose of companionship, pleasure or social amenities, the plaintiff's
testimony was sufficient "for the jury to find . a contracted relationship
))~41for transportation...
C. Care Required of Motorists
1. INTERSECTION ACCIDENTS
Intersection accidents usually involve some degree of negligence on
the part of both parties to the accident. Thus, contributory negligence gen-
erally bars recovery in this type of case. Four judgments for defendants
were affirmed 4' and one plaintiff's judgment was reversed and remanded
for a new trial.4 3
In addition to the normal issues concerning negligence, intersection
accident cases raised some interesting evidentiary issues and one rather
unorthodox procedural issue.
In Collins v. Farley,44 an automobile accident was held to be a "trans-
action" within the meaning of the dead man's statute." The plaintiff of-
fered evidence concerning the actions of the deceased driver which was
admitted over the defendant-administrator's objection. After an extensive
review of the applicability of similar statues in other jurisdictions, 46 the
appellate court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding
that, "we are not unmindful that the word 'transaction' has been strictly
construed. '47 Nevertheless, both drivers' actions are so closely related
41. 144 So.2d 840, 841 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
42. Cash v. Gates, 151 So.2d 838 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963), Pope v. Kay, 146 So.2d 621 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1962), Couey v. Miles, 136 So.2d 252 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962), and Kowalczyk v.
Brudder, 134 So.2d 532 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
43. New Deal Cab Co., v. Meyer, 139 So.2d 189 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
44. 137 So.2d 31 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
45. FLA. STAT. § 90.05 (1963).
46. To the effect that an automobile accident is not a "transaction" within meaning
of the dead man's statute, see Rankin v. Morgan, 193 Ark. 751, 102 S.W.2d 552 (1937);
Turbot v. Repp, 247 Iowa 69, 72 N.W.2d 565 (1953); Shaneybrook v. Blizzard, 209 Md.
304, 121 A.2d 218 (1956). Contra: Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Davidson, 225 Ala. 171,
142 So. 63 (1932); Countryman v. Sullivan, 344 Ill. App. 371, 100 N.E.2d 799 (1951);
In re Mueller's Estate, 166 Neb. 376, 89 N.W.2d 137 (1958). See generally JONES, EVIDENCE
§ 773 (5th ed. 1958).
47. "The word 'transaction' as used in the Statute was construed by the Supreme
Court of Florida, to encompass every variety of affairs which can form the subject of
negotiation, interviews or actions between two persons. . . ." Holliday v. McKinne, 22 Fla.
153 (1886); Chapin v. Mitchell, 44 Fla. 225, 32 So. 875 (1902) ; Embrey v. Southern Gas
& Electric Corp., 63 So.2d 258 (Fla. 1953), Collins, supra note 44, at 35, citing Day v.
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and connected with the accident that their courses and movements con-
stitute a "variety of affair which [is] ... the subject of action between two
persons. '48 In ruling on an ancillary issue, the appellate court held that
the authentic copies of the plaintiff's income tax returns should have been
admitted in evidence on cross-examination for the purpose of impeach-
ing the plaintiff's testimony as to his earnings before the accident.
In another intersection case,49 testimony that the defendant had run
two red lights within 3,500 feet of the intersection where the collision oc-
curred was held to be relevant to show a course of conduct pertinent to
the circumstances of the collision. Its admission was not such an abuse of
the trial court's discretion as to require a reversal."
A directed verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed in Garris v. Robei-
son,51 even though a motion to strike 2 the defendant's plea of contribu-
tory negligence was granted. The court reasoned that while the "procedure
employed by the court was unorthodox," it was "at most only a harmlessly
erroneous procedural method of arriving at a proper result.'*a
2. REAR-END COLLISIONS
A typical rear-end collision case, in which a party who has stopped
for a traffic signal or at an intersection is struck in the rear, raises a pre-
sumption of negligence on the part of -the operator of the offending vehi-
cle. 4 The major difficulty encountered in this type of case is the deter-
mination by the trial court of the quantum of evidence necessary either to
rebut the presumption, thus presenting a question of fact for the jury,
or to determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to a directed verdict on
the issue of liability.
In Vasquez v. Stark,55 the defendant testified that when she applied
her brakes two car lengths from the plaintiff, they locked, causing her
Stickle, 113 So.2d 559, 563 (1959), to the effect that the dead man's statute does not apply
to two guests in an automobile.
48. Collins v. Farley, supra note 44, at 35.
49. See also, e.g., MacCurdy v. United States, 246 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1957), affirming,
143 F. Supp. 60 (N.D. FLA. 1956) ; Melville v. State, 155 F.2d 440 (4th Cir. 1956) ; Jennings
v. Arata, 83 Cal. App. 2d 143, 188 P.2d 298 (1948) ; Baynard v. Liberman, 139 So.2d 485
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
50. But see Le Fevre v. Bear, 113 So.2d 390 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1959) (Evidence of indul-
gence in intoxicating beverages not admissible).
51. 146 So.2d 388 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
52. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(f).
53. Supra note 51, at 389.
54. Where a defendant runs into the rear of the plaintiff's car while the plaintiff is
stopped for a traffic light or at an intersection, there is a presumption of negligence on
which the plaintiff would be entitled to recover in the absence of an explanation by the
defendant. Bellere v. Madsen, 114 So.2d 619, 621 (Fla. 1959).
55. 155 So.2d 905 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963). See also Kimenker v. Greater Miami Car
Rental, Inc., 115 So.2d 191 (Fla. 1959) ; Sheehan v. Allred, 146 So.2d 760 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1962).
vehicle to skid on the wet pavement and strike the plaintiff's car in the
rear. A verdict and judgment for the defendant was reversed. The de-
fendant's explanation was not sufficient to rebut the presumption and the
plaintiff was entitled to a directed verdict on the issue of liability and to
a new trial on the issue of damages.
In a similar fact pattern,5" the defendant testified that she applied her
brakes within two or three car lengths of the plaintiff, that the brakes
"grabbed" momentarily, and then failed completely. Additional testimony
by mechanical experts was to the effect that the brakes were defective
due to a pin-hole rupture in the main hydraulic brake line.17 A verdict for
the defendant was affirmed on the grounds that 'the defendant's explana-
tion was sufficient to establish a question of fact for the jury.5"
In an intersection rear-end collision, a judgment for the defendant
was affirmed. 9 Both cars were proceeding through -the intersection after
being stopped for a red light. The plaintiff testified he stopped in the
middle of the intersection because a police car was entering from his
right. The defendant testified he was distracted by the flashing red light
of the police car and did not see the plaintiff stop until it was too late
to avoid the collision. The police officer testified he had stopped for the red
light some eight or ten seconds before the collision. The court held that
the issues of the negligence of both parties were properly left to the
jury.
A jury verdict for the defendant was reversed in a case involving a
rear-end collision when both vehicles were in motion. In Central Truck
Lines, Inc., v. Rogers,60 the lead truck slowed down from forty miles per
hour to an estimated six to twelve miles per hour while approaching a rail-
road crossing. The defendant's truck passed an intermediate truck, cut
back into the right lane and struck the rear of the lead truck. The trial
court instructed the jury "that the law of Florida does not require any
vehicle to come to a stop at a grade railroad crossing except passenger
buses, school buses and vehicles carrying explosive substances .. .""
The appellate court reasoned, therefore, that the only basis upon which
the jury could have arrived at its verdict was to find that the plaintiff's
56. Guelli v. Kraus, 145 So.2d 900 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
57. The rupture was caused by "condensation of moisture inside the steel brake line,
producing rust corrosion inside the line, which would not be apparent from visual outside
inspection. The corrosion caused the brake line to fail under pressure of the application
of the brakes." Id. at 902.
58. See also Pensacola Transit Co. v. Denton, 119 So.2d 296 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1960)
(Driver's testimony that brakes simply did not function sufficient to raise jury question).
59. Gordon v. May, 149 So.2d 394 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
60. 140 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
61. Id. at 131. See FLA. STAT. § 317.451 (1963). The court stressed the point that while
the statute applies only to buses and vehicles carrying explosives and flammables, "it does,
however, suggest a standard of care for others to follow and cannot . . . be construed
as imposing a duty on other drivers not to slow down or stop ... .
1964] TORTS
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XVIII
driver was negligent in decelerating his speed at the crossing and that such
deceleration was the proximate cause of the collision. In granting a judg-
ment non obstante verdicto, the court held that persons entering rail-
road crossings must exercise a high degree of care62 and a motorist
who prudently slows down or stops for a railroad crossing is not guilty of
negligence.63
A sudden stop in moving traffic often results in an additional type
of rear-end collision. In reversing a judgment for the plaintiff entered on
a directed verdict as to liability, the appellate court held that conflicting
testimony as to whether the stop had been sudden or slow and gradual
was a question of fact for the jury.64 In another case, a judgment for
the defendant was affirmed. The issue of the plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence for failure, in violation of a city ordinance, to give a hand signal
when stopping, was held to have been determined properly as a jury ques-
tion.65
3. PEDESTRIANS
The rights and responsibilities of motorists and pedestrians in the
use of highways are reciprocal, and both most exercise ordinary care under
the existing circumstances.66 The most significant number of reversals oc-
curred in cases involving minor pedestrians under the age of ten years, in
which the trial court did not allow the question of negligence to go to the
jury.
In Sheehan v. Frith," a three year-old was struck while crossing a
one-way street in the middle of the block. Conflicting testimony was given
concerning the speed at which the boy was walking 8 and whether the
driver came to a slow and gradual, or fast, panic stop with a squeal of
brakes."9 A judgment entered on a directed verdict for the defendant
62. In Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Walker, 113 So.2d 420, 422 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1959), the court said: "The settled law of Florida requires a person approaching a grade
crossing to look and listen for oncoming trains, and to stop if what he sees indicates that
it would be dangerous to proceed further."
63. The accident occurred on a dark but clear night on a four lane highway with a
dividing strip. The plaintiff's driver began applying his brakes and flashing a caution signal
over 500 yards north of the crossing.
64. Miller v. Griffin, 154 So.2d 333 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963). See also Jeskey v. Yellow
Cab Co., Inc., 136 So.2d 376 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962) (directed verdict for plaintiff upheld
where plaintiff made a sudden stop to avoid a car which cut in front of him); Staicer v.
Hall, 130 So.2d 113 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961) (Issues raised by conflicting testimony properly
left to jury).
65. Jeskey v. Yellow Cab Co., Inc., 136 So.2d 376 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
66. King v. Griner, 60 So.2d 177, 178 (Fla. 1952).
67. 138 So.2d 76 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
68. The defendant testified that the boy was trotting, but a witness testified that the
boy was walking slowly. Id. at 77.
69. The driver testified he made a panic stop, jamming on his brakes so hard that
the engine stalled. One witness, 25 feet away, said the car came to a slow gradual stop
with no squeal of brakes and another, 100 feet away, that the car came to a fast panic
stop, with the squeal of brakes. Id. at 78.
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was reversed, the court holding that "conflicting evidence should be sub-
mitted to the jury whose function it is to weigh and evaluate the evidence
,,70
A seven year-old was struck when he jumped from the back of a
horse-drawn wagon to retrieve a toy which he had dropped.7' Conflicting
testimony was given with respect to the defendant's speed and whether the
point of impact occurred over the center line of the highway and on the
side upon which the wagon was traveling. A new trial was granted on the
grounds that the evidence was sufficient .to establish a prima facie case
of negligence.72
Summary judgments for the defendants were reversed in two cases.
In Bermudez v. Jenkins,7' an eight year-old was struck as he darted into
a street while attempting to flee from an irate homeowner. The home-
owner had mistakenly believed that the plaintiff was one of several culprits
who had been stealing her oranges, and while shouting and waving a hula
hoop, she advanced upon the child. The court held that -the question of
the child's contributory negligence was one of fact for the jury.74
Similarly, a defendant's deposition which merely stated that she was
driving slowly and did not see the child until she was right on top of the
car, was held to be insufficient to support a summary judgment. 75
Judgments entered on directed verdicts for the defendants were af-
firmed, however, in two cases involved sixteen year-old plaintiffs. In
one case, 76 the plaintiff was crossing a four lane highway with a girl friend.
The defendant driver was traveling north within the speed limit and in
the right hand lane. The plaintiff's companion darted across the left north-
bound lane and into the path of defendant's car in the right northbound
lane. In attempting to avoid the first girl the defendant swerved to the
70. Id. at 77.
71. Massaline v. Rich, 137 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
72. The appeal was from a judgment of non-suit, taken after the trial judge announced
his intention to grant the defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the conclusion of
the plaintiff's case. Ibid.
73. 144 So.2d 859 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
74. "The standard of conduct imposed upon a child is only such care and prudence
as could be reasonably expected of a child of its age and intelligence. . . .When a case
is close on issues of ... contributory negligence doubt should always be resolved in favor
of a jury trial." Id. at 860-861. See also Bess v. 17545 Collins Ave., Inc., 98 So.2d 490
(Fla. 1957) ; City of Jacksonville v. Stokes, 74 So.2d 278 (Fla. 1954) ; Quinn v. I. C. Helmly
Furniture Co., 141 So.2d 302 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962); Holmes v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five,
Inc., 133 So.2d 651 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
75. Smith v. Musso, 151 So.2d 475 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
It is elemental that the movant at all times carries the burden of clearly and
unequivocally establishing the right to summary judgment, and that it cannot be
granted if there exists any controverted issues of material fact or if the proofs
supporting the motion fail to overcome every theory upon which, under the plead-
ings, the adversary's position might be sustained. . . .Posey v. Pensacola Tractor
and Equipment Co., 138 So.2d 777, 779 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
76. Green v. Loudermilk, 146 So.2d 601 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
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left, partly into the left lane and in so doing, struck the plaintiff who had
started across, stopped, and then moved forward again, into the diverted
path of the defendant's automobile.
The other case 7 involved a sixteen year-old boy who was struck
while attempting to cross a limited access causeway at the end of a bridge.
He testified that he saw the defendant's vehicle and that he misjudged its
speed. In affirming, the court held that "where the plaintiff's own testi-
mony is sufficient to show that he contributed proximately to . . . [the]
injuries . . . sustained and in the absence of showing of negligence on the
part of ,the defendant, the trial court will not ... have erred in directing
a verdict .... ,,18
The defense of loss of consciousness" while driving was extensively
reviewed in Malcolm v. Patrick.80 The plaintiff was struck from behind
when the defendant's automobile, operated by his minor son, ran up on a
sidewalk. The defense asserted was that the son suffered a loss of con-
sciousness or blackout which caused him to lose control of the vehicle.
8
'
Expert -testimony established that the son suffered from petit mal epilepsy,
but was in conflict as to whether it existed prior to the accident. The trial
judge instructed the jury that "a driver who suffers a sudden loss of con-
sciousness ... is not guilty of negligence unless ... prior to such loss...
he knew or ... should have known that he might suffer a loss of conscious-
ness."82 A verdict for the plaintiff was set aside by the trial court and a
new trial granted on the grounds 'that the portion of the charge dealing
with premonition was erroneous. On appeal, the order was reversed and
the case remanded for reinstatement of the verdict. The court held that
the charge was correct and that 'to establish such a defense the defendant
has the burden of proving, first, a sudden physical or mental incapacity,
and second, the unanticipatable and unforeseen nature of such incapa-
city.
In two other pedestrian cases, an issue arose concerning the admissi-
bility of information contained in an accident report-one in a jurisdic-
tional and the other in a substantive context.
In Ellswortk v. Nash Miami Motors, Inc., 8a the supreme court classi-
77. Baro v. Wilson, 134 So.2d 843 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
78. Id. at 845. See also Carter v. Florida Power and Light Co., 138 Fla. 220, 189
So. 705 (1939) ; Robb v. Pike, 119 Fla. 833, 161 So. 732 (1935).
79. For a general discussion of this defense, see 5A Ama. JUR. Automobiles and Highway
Traffic § 223, page 365, 366 (1936).
80. 147 So.2d 188 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
81. Knowledge of one's unfitness to drive is the crucial issue. "It is not even simple
negligence if one has a sudden attack, loses control of his car and causes an accident if
he had no premonition or warning. In such an event the very foundation of negligence-
knowledge and . . . foreseeability-is absent." Bridges v. Speer, 79 So.2d 679, 681 (Fla.
1955). See also Williams v. Frohock, 114 So.2d 221 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959).
82. Supra note 80, at 189.
83. 142 So.2d 733 (Fla. 1962).
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fled a lower court decision 4 reversing a judgment for the plaintiff on the
grounds that information given to a special investigator was entitled to a
privilege 5 the same as that of the information provided in the official ac-
cident report, 6 as a case of first impression. Therefore, the court was
without jurisdiction to review the case by writ of certiorari.8 7
In the second case, 8 the plaintiff was interviewed in the hospital
by an investigating officer. The officer was permitted to testify as to the
plaintiff's statements, on the theory that only those statements made to
investigators by drivers are privileged. 9 The appellate court rejected this
interpretation, holding that the admission was improper. While the stat-
ute9 ° does not specifically require a pedestrian involved in an accident to
make a report, if he does, his statements come within the cloak of im-
munity.
4. LAST CLEAR CHANCE 9 1
The doctrine of last clear chance is designed to insulate a plaintiff
from the harshness of the rule of contributory negligence. The trial judge's
problem, however, in determining exactly which factual situations re-
quire the application of the doctrine, is reflected in five cases which were
reversed either for applying the doctrine or for failing to do so.
In Delevis v. Troyer,9" the plaintiff's vehicle was struck on the left
rear fender as he proceeded to make a left turn on a two lane highway. The
defendant at the time was attempting to pass in the left lane. A summary
judgment was entered for the defendant on the grounds that the plaintiff's
84. Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v. Ellsworth, 129 So.2d 704 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
85. FLA. STAT. § 317.13 (1963) requires reports of accidents and provides that sup-
plemental reports may be required when necessary.
86. FLA. STAT. § 317.17 (1963) provides that except for certain limited exceptions, all
accident reports shall be confidential and no report shall be used as evidence in any trial.
87. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4, provides: "The Supreme Court may review by certiorari
any decision of a district court of appeal that effects a class of constitutional or state
officers, or that passes upon a question certified by the district court of appeal to be of
great public interest or that is in direct conflict with a decision of another district court
of appeal or of the supreme court. . ....
88. Williams v. Scott, 153 So.2d 18 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
89. The officer testified only that he definitely recalled that "she [plaintiff] did not
know what color the light was." Id. at 19.
90. FLA. STAT. § 317.15-17 (1963).
91. The elements, under Florida law, necessary to invoke the doctrine were re-stated
in James v. Keene, 133 So.2d 297, 299 (Fla. 1961):
(1) . . . the injured party has already come into a position of peril; (2) . . . the
injuring party then or thereafter becomes, or in the exercise of ordinary prudence
ought to have become aware not only of that fact, but also that the party in
peril either reasonably cannot escape from it, or apparently will not avail himself
of opportunities open to him for doing so; (3) ... the injuring party subsequently
has the opportunity by the exercise of reasonable care to save the other from
harm; and (4) . . .he fails to exercise such care.
See also Parker v. Perfection Cooperative Dairies, 102 So.2d 645 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958).
Comment, 17 U. MiA1ViI L. REv. 582 (1963).
92. 142 So.2d 783 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
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failure to give a left turn signal constituted contributory negligence as a
matter of law and was sufficient to bar recovery. On appeal the case was
reversed, the court holding that violation of a traffic law93 is not negligence
per se, but only prima facie negligence,94 and that an issue under the doc-
trine of the last clear chance well could have been pertinent.
New trials were granted in two wrongful death actions for failure
of the trial court to apply the doctrine. The plaintiff's deceased husband
was fishing from a causeway draw bridge when struck and killed by the
defendant's truck. The driver testified that he must have seen the fisher-
men, but that he was not paying any attention to them because he was
watching the traffic. Such facts were sufficient to justify an instruction
on last clear chance. 5 In the other case,9 6 a rider was killed when his horse
was struck by a dump truck. Testimony indicated that the horse and
rider were perpendicular to the highway, with the horse's feet on the
shoulder of the road but with his hind quarter projecting a few feet over
the curb into the highway.97 The driver saw the rider approximately
400 or 500 yards ahead of him but did not reduce his speed until the
point of impact. Upon a review of all the evidence, the court held that
although there was no question but that the jury would have been war-
ranted in returning a verdict for the defendant, the plaintiff was entitled
to have the factual issue determined by the jury under proper instructions
on the doctrine of last clear chance. 8
A classic example"9 of a fact pattern warranting the application of the
doctrine was presented in Golden v. Harrell,'00 in which the defendant's
trailer truck ran out of gas in the middle of a hill at night. In attempting to
roll backwards off the highway, the driver jackknifed the trailer, com-
pletely blocking the highway approximately 600 feet below the crest of
the hill. The driver had no flares, fuses or reflectors available. Other
93. FLA. STAT. § 317.37 (1963) requires a motorist to give a turn signal within the
last one-hundred feet traveled prior to turning.
94. Gudath v. Culp Lumber Co., 81 So.2d 742 (Fla. 1955); Clark v. Sumner, 72 So.2d
375 (Fla. 1954); C: W. Zaring & Co. v. Dennis, 155 Fla. 150, 19 So.2d 701 (1944); Allen
v. Hooper, 126 Fla. 458, 171 So. 513 (1937). See also, Morrison v. C. J. Jones Lumber Co.,
126 So.2d 895 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
95. Wasserman v. Miller, 143 So.2d 210 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
96. Baker v. Stolley, 155 So.2d 809 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
97. The horse had only one small bruise on his right rear rump. The rider was thrown
into the truck and suffered two crushed legs and severe head injuries, resulting in his
death twenty-six days later.
98. Supra note 96, at 813-14.
99. The classic example of the doctrine of last clear chance exists when a plaintiff,
through his negligence, has placed himself in a position of peril from which he cannot
extricate himself. In this situation, the plaintiff can recover despite his negligence if the
defendant, after he knew or should have known of the plaintiff's peril, and by the exercise
of ordinary care had the last clear chance to avoid injuring the plaintiff, but failed to do so.
See Shattuck v. Mullen, 115 So.2d 597 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1959) ; and also Miami Beach R. Co.
v. Dohne, 131 Fla. 171, 179 So. 166 (1938); Merchant's Transp. Co. v. Daniel, 109 Fla.
496, 149 So. 401 (1933).
100. 147 So.2d 350 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
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motorists stopped to assist him and one stationed himself near the crest
of the hill to warn oncoming traffic of the blockade. The plaintiffs, driver
and passenger, although flagged down by the volunteer motorist at the
crest of the hill, proceeded past him without reducing their speed and
crashed into the truck. Judgments entered for the defendants on the
original complaint and counterclaim were affirmed, the court holding
that with respect to the counterclaim, it was proper for the trial judge to
instruct the jury upon the doctrine of last clear chance.
In cases in which both parties are mutually inattentive and thus
unaware of each other until the moment of impact, the courts appear to
be unable to draw a line of demarcation which will preclude an instruction
on last clear chance. 1°1 The probability, rather than the mere possibility,
that the defendant had an opportunity to observe the plight of the plain-
tiff seems to be the objective criterion employed to determine whether
application of the doctrine is warranted. However, the application of the
standard to each factual pattern remains a problem. In two pedestrian
cases °" in which both plaintiffs were clearly visible and could have been
seen had the defendant exercised ordinary care, the appellate court held
that the doctrine was properly applied. However, in Gilman v. Rupert,'°'
a pedestrian, while standing in an empty parking space, was struck by the
defendant's automobile which was being backed into the space; the
refusal of the trial judge to instruct the jury on last clear chance was
upheld. By exercising reasonable care, both parties could have avoided
the accident at any time up to the actual impact; consequently, if the
plaintiff has an opportunity to extricate himself and fails to do so, his
contributory negligence can not be overcome.
5. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Because of. the severity of the rule of contributory negligence, ap-
pellate courts are reluctant to affirm any lower court decision unless it
is based upon a properly instructed jury verdict.
In Sterling v. Hawkesworth,0 4 the plaintiff alleged that his injury
101. James v. Keene, 133 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1961), quashing 121 So.2d 186 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1960). The supreme court impliedly rejected the lower court's holding that mutual in-
attentiveness of the parties precluded an instruction on last clear chance. The plaintiff had
been visible for several hundred feet, but the defendant testified she did not see her until too
late to avoid impact, But see Douglas v. Hackney, 133 So.2d 301 (Fla. 1961). There the only
evidence was the driver's testimony that he did not see the plaintiff prior to striking him
at night on a busy thoroughfare; the supreme court found no basis in the facts for a charge
on last clear chance.
102. Greenfield v. Frantz, 144 So.2d 878 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962) (pedestrian crossing
well lighted street at night) ; Whitten v. Erny, 152 So.2d 510 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963) (motorist
over 150 feet away when plaintiff started across street).
103. 145 So.2d 746 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962) ; accord, Wawner v. Sellic Stone Studio, 74
So.2d 574 (Fla. 1954); Lindsay v. Thomas, 128 Fla. 293, 174 So. 418 (1937). As to the
duty of the trial judge upon request for instruction in last clear chance, see Yousko v. Vogt,
63 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1953).
104. 139 So.2d 740 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
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was caused by the defendant's reckless conduct. The trial court granted
the plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict on the issue of liability. On ap-
peal, the case was reversed and remanded for a new ,trial. The appellate
court held that under the evidence "the trial judge abused his discretion
in taking from the jury the question of contributory negligence or assump-
tion of the risk." 105
However, in C. J. Jones Lumber Co. Inc. v. Morrison,°6 the plain-
tiff was injured and her child killed in a virtual head-on collision with a
trailer truck. The accident occurred at night on a road which was under
construction. There was conflicting testimony as to the width of the road
and whether the !truck's clearance lights were on. The plaintiff testified
that initially, upon observing the truck when it was one-half mile away,
she thought it was a motorcycle because she saw only one headlight. 7
Thereafter, while traveling at a speed of thirty-five miles per hour, she
failed to see the vehicle again or to realize that it was a truck until it was
only six feet away, because she kept her eyes on -the road and not on the
approaching vehicle. Although both of the truck's headlights burned on
high beam, only the right one burned on low beam. The truck driver
testified that he had switched his lights from low to high beam because
the plaintiff would not dim her headlights, and that he slowed to a speed
of fifteen miles per hour until he reached a point fifty feet from the
plaintiff. Realizing that a collision was imminent, the truck driver de-
creased his speed to five miles per hour and veered slightly to the right.
The left front of the plaintiff's vehicle struck the left side of the truck.
Testimony by the investigating officer was 'to the effect that the point of
impact was eight feet and two inches across and into the defendant's
lane of travel. In reversing a judgment for the plaintiff, the appellate
court held 'that upon a:
careful review of the entire record ... bearing in mind it is the
province of the jury to determine disputed questions of fact...
we are compelled to the conclusion that ... there is reasonable
ground to conclude that the jury acted through sympathy, pas-
sion, [and] prejudice .. .and it is our duty to grant a new
trial. 108
Similarly, a judgment non obstante verdicto was reversed and rein-
105. "[A] plaintiff's contributory negligence does not bar recovery for harm caused
by the defendant's reckless disregard for the plaintiff's safety." Id. at 741. But a plaintiff
may be barred from recovery for such action if, knowing of the defendant's reckless mis-
conduct, and the danger involved, the plaintiff recklessly exposes himself to it. See 2 RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS § 482 (1934),
106. 154 So.2d 721 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
107. FLA. STAT. § 317.47 (1963) requires trucks to have two headlights. Violation of a
statute is prima facie evidence of negligence. Alessi v. Farkas, 118 So.2d 658 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1960), also concerning FLA. STAT. § 317.46 (1963).
108. C. J. Jones Lumber Co. v. Morrison, supra note 106, at 724.
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statement of the jury verdict was ordered in Rojer v. Jensen.'09 In Rofer,
the plaintiff motorcyclist struck the oncoming defendant's automobile,
which was stopped in the center lane preparing to make a left turn. The
testimony was in conflict as to whether the lights of both vehicles were
on, and whether the defendant's vehicle was only a foot or two, or as
much as halfway across the center line. Relying upon the range of vision
rule,"' the trial judge determined that the plaintiff was guilty of con-
tributory negligence. The appellate court held that "while it is true that
under the facts . . . [the] plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory
negligence, this was a question of fact for ... the jury and ... not ... a
question of law. It was therefore erroneous for the trial court to set aside
the verdict . .. ."111
II. STATUTORY LIABILITY
A. Statutes Affecting the Right to Maintain an Action
In Davis v. Shiappacossee,"2 the sale of intoxicating liquors to a
minor in violation of a statute"' was held to be negligence per se. The ven-
dor was liable for the death of the plaintiff's sixteen year-old son. The sale
was made at a drive-in liquor store and the accident occurred six hours
later when the boy, under the influence of the liquor, lost control of his
vehicle. The accident was held to be reasonably forseeable and the proxi-
mate result of the vendor's negligence.
In Williams v. Youngblood," 4 the plaintiff's son lost his eye as a
result of a BB shot by another child. In an action against the child's
father, a jury verdict for the plaintiff was reversed. The statute, in
providing a penalty for an adult who permits a child for whose welfare
he is responsible and who is under the age of sixteen to use or possess a
BB gun outside of the adult's supervision and presence, was intended
as a criminal measure and designed to protect the public generally. It
does not impose vicarious liability, and in order to recover, the plaintiff
must show that the adult was negligent.
The Florida wrongful death act 15 creates a cause of action cognizable
in both the Florida and federal courts, for the death of any person caused
109. 141 So.2d 791 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
110. One whose vision is obscured has a duty to exercise care under the circumstances
and to stop if necessary, and the operator of an automobile must be able to stop within
his range of vision, both during the day and at night time. See Cruse v. Wilson, 92 So.2d
270 (Fla. 1957); Macasphalt Corp. v. Murphy, 67 So.2d 438 (Fla. 1953).
111. Rofer v. Jensen, supra note 109, at 794.
112. 155 So.2d 365 (Fla. 1963), reversing, 145 So.2d 758 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962). Accord,
Tamiami Gun Shop v. Klein, 109 So.2d 189 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959) (Sale of gun to minor).
113. FLA. STAT. § 562.11 (1963).
114. 152 So.2d 530 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1963).
115. FLA. STAT. § 768.01(1) (1963).
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by the negligent operation of a vessel if the death occurs within the terri-
torial waters of Florida." 6
B. Federal Employer's Liability Act
New trials were ordered in two suits by employees under the FELA."'
In one case admission into evidence of a city ordinance regulating the
speed of trains coupled with a jury charge that its violation was prima
facie negligence was held to be reversible error.1 The act is the para-
mount law governing the liability of a railroad to its employees while the
carrier is engaged in interstate commerce." 9 Therefore, "no state statute,
law or other enactment can enlarge or contract the operation of the act
and the rights and obligations arising thereunder."' 20
In the other case, 21 after a verdict was rendered for the defendant,
the trial court ordered a new trial because of its error in recalling and
instructing the jury in accordance with the usual instructions as to proxi-
mate cause given in common law cases. Such action was not in abuse of
discretion, in view of the extent to which the concept of proximate cause
has been modified under the federal act. 122
If the basis of a suit under the FELA is the fraudulent procurement
of a settlement, tender of the proceeds of such settlement is a condition
precedent to maintenance of the action. 2 '
C. Railroad Operation
The Village of Miami Shores was held 24 not responsible for requiring
a railroad properly to maintain a crossing 25 within its boundaries when
the county had designated the street on which the crossing was located
as an arterial highway, and had assumed the duty of supervising the physi-
cal condition of the street on either side of the crossing.
In two cases involving suits by railroad employees against their
employer, judgments for the employees were affirmed. In one, 2 ' the
116. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Reed Const. Corp., 149 So.2d 578 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1963). But see Young v. Clyde S. S. Co., 294 F. 549, 552 (S.D. Fla. 1923).
117. 45 U.S.C. § 51-60 (1958).
118. Florida East Coast Ry. v. Pollack, 154 So.2d 346 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
119. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Rhoda, 73 Fla. 12, 74 So. 19 (1917).
120. Supra note 118, at 347. See also Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. v. Stapleton, 279 U.S.
587 (1929); Davee v. Southern Pacific Ry. Co., 58 Cal.2d 572, 375 P.2d 293 (1962).
121. Florida East Coast Ry. v. Pierce, 142 So.2d 121 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
122. The railroad's liability under the liberal federal interpretation is a jury question
if the employer's negligence was even the slightest cause of the injury. E.g., Connor v.
Butler, 361 U.S. 29 (1959) ; Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Barrett, 101 So.2d 37 (Fla. 1958);
McCloskey v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 122 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1960); Butler
v. Gay, 118 So.2d 572 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959).
123. Overstreet v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 152 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
124. Melville v. Miami Shores, 155 So.2d 739 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
125. FLA. STAT. § 357.01 (1963).
126. Florida East Coast Ry. v. Booth, 148 So.2d 536 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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plaintiff trainman was injured by flying glass when a rock thrown at
the train shattered a window. The defendant contended that the special
pass used by the employee was a gratuity and, thus, the conditions printed
on the back of the pass-that the user assumed all risks of travel and that
the railroad should not be considered a common carrier or liable to the
user for negligence-barred his recovery. The appellate court affirmed the
ruling of the trial court in holding that since the pass was issued pursuant
to a union contract requirement, it was issued for a consideration, thereby
rendering ineffective the provisions which limited the defendant's liability.
In the other case,'2" the failure of the trial court to giye a requested
jury charge that was proper and applicable was not reversible error where
its substance or subject was covered in other charges given by the court
or where the failure to give it was not shown to be prejudicial.
In Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Flournoy,"8 a jury charge as
to the statutory presumption of a railroad's liability 129 was held to be
reversible error since the defendant railroad had offered evidence tending
to prove that its agents had exercised all ordinary and reasonable care
and diligence under the circumstances.'
In Florida East Coast Ry. v. Schweida,'3' the plaintiff's automobile
stalled upon a heavily traveled crossing just before the crossing signals
began to operate. Evidence as to whether the train's speed was excessive
in view of the character of the crossing, the location of 'tripping devices
to activate the warning signals and gates, and the failure to apply the
emergency brakes was held to present a proper question of fact as to -the
railroad's negligence for the jury to determine.
Similarly, evidence that the railroad had allowed brush to grow upon
its right of way so that the driver's view was obscured, plus the train's
excessive speed, and evidence of the plaintiff's negligence was held to be
a proper question for the jury, especially in view of the applicability of
the comparative negligence rule.13 2
In Florida East Coast Ry. v. Soper,'3 3 two deaf-mutes were killed in
a crossing accident. The only warning device employed was the usual
crossbuck sign. A curve in the track made it impossible for the train crew
to see the crossing until it was approximately 600 feet away. In addition,
a thick growth of vegetation and trees located off the railroad right of
way prevented either party from seeing the other until within fifteen or
twenty feet from the crossing. The train approached the crossing with its
127. Florida East Coast Ry. v. Lawler, 151 So.2d 852 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
128. 136 So.2d 32 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961).
129. FLA. STAT. § 768.05 (1963).
130. Accord, Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Walker, 113 So.2d 420 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1959).
131. 151 So.2d 665 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
132. Florida East Coast Ry. v. Haywood, 145 So.2d 533 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
133. 146 So.2d 605 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
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whistle blowing, bells ringing and lights on. The evidence was in conflict
as to the speed of the train. In affirming a judgment for the plaintiffs, the
court held that the degree of care required of a railroad is variable and
dependent upon the circumstances of a particular case and the danger
existing at a particular crossing. The court pointed out that in Atlantic
Coast Line R.R. v. Smith,' it was held that, "it may not always be
enough to blow the whistle and ring the bell . . . where the tracks
are in a congested area . . . [and] vision is obstructed . .. . 5
In two other crossing accidents, conflicting evidence as to whether
the approaching train gave adequate warning signals was held to present
a question of fact for the jury. In one case,'136 a judgment on a jury verdict
for the plaintiff was affirmed, and in the other 13 7 a judgment non obstante
verdicto entered by the trial court in favor of the defendant was re-
versed with directions to reinstate the jury verdict for the plaintiff.
In another case,3 8 a lumber yard worker walked directly into the
path of a train in spite of the fact that the train's whistle was blowing and
its bell was ringing. In affirming a judgment entered on a directed verdict
for the defendant, the court held that "the plaintiff neglected to observe
the most elementary duty of care imposed upon him to protect himself
from an obvious hazard . . . .13 His failure to do so . . . [in conjunction
with] the care that was exercised by the railroad, supports the finding
that ... [his] death was caused solely by his own negligence."' 40
Similarly, in another crossing case,' 4 ' the plaintiff's negligence was
held to be the sole proximate cause of his injuries. The issue as to
whether there were lighted fuses on either side of the ,tracks at the time
of the collision was held to be insufficient to prevent the entry of a sum-
mary judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff was driving a fifty foot,
thirty-four wheel 'trailer truck.'42 The accident occurred on a foggy morn-
ing and the evidence showed he was traveling at a reckless speed and
should have been acquainted with the crossing, since he had traveled the
same route for six months.
134. 53 So.2d 301 (Fla. 1951).
135. Id. at 302.
136. Florida East Coast Ry. v. Ross, 151 So.2d 32 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
137. Ely v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 138 So.2d 521 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962). The plaintiff
and several witnesses testified that they did not see or hear any warning signals. The
defendant's witnesses testified that regular warnings were given by bell, whistle, and lights.
138. Knott v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 151 So.2d 11 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
139. Witnesses testified that the plaintiff walked at a steady gait and never looked in
the direction of the train.
140. Supra note 138, at 12.
141. McDonald v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 155 So.2d 625 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
142. The truck laid down 192 feet of skid marks and the impact overturned one rail-
road car and derailed two others. The load of sod on the trailer was thrown over the
railroad cars and landed on the highway on the opposite side of the tracks.
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III. COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS
A. Landlord and Tenant
Although during the period surveyed no significant changes occurred
in the law in this area, some interesting factual patterns were presented.
The issue of liability for a latent defect 143 was presented in two cases.
In Zubowicz v. Warnock,'44 the plaintiff-lessee was injured when a con-
crete slab at the rear door of his premises gave way as he entered the
store. He had never noticed anything wrong with the concrete prior to
the accident, but it was evident after the accident that the earth beneath
the slab had eroded. In affirming a directed verdict for the defendant, the
court held that since the defect may or may not have been in existence
at the inception of the lease, the lessee, "being the occupant of the
premises, was in as good or better position to know of such defect... 145
as the landlord.
In Feldman v. Jacobs,'46 however, a dismissal with prejudice was
reversed when the plaintiff alleged that she was injured when she stepped
into a hole in a threshold of her apartment which was concealed by wall
to wall carpeting, and that the defect was known to the lessor and was
not discoverable by the plaintiff by reasonable inspection.
Summary judgments for the defendant-landlords were affirmed in
three cases. In Lipnick v. Sabal Palm Apartments, Inc.,'147 the court held
that the landlord was not responsible for the control of motor vehicle
traffic adjacent to an area in an apartment house complex designated for
children. The court held that the failure to control such traffic afforded
no basis for liability for injuries sustained by a tenant's infant when she
was struck by an automobile some forty feet from the play area.
No recovery was allowed against the landlord for injuries which
occurred when the plaintiff-tenant fell over a pipe protruding from a
city sidewalk adjacent to a common passageway to the apartment house. 48
Similarly, when the defect complained of was known to the plaintiff and
had existed during the entire period of his tenancy, the plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of law.'49
143. To impose liability upon a lessor for a latent defect, the lessee must plead and
prove that the defect 1) was known to the lessor; 2) was not known to the lessee, nor
discoverable by him on a reasonable inspection; and 3) it was not disclosed by the lessor
to the lessee and injury resulted therefrom. Wilensky v. Perell, 72 So.2d 278 (Fla. 1954)
Butler v. Maney, 146 Fla. 33, 200 So. 226 (Fla. 1941).
144. 149 So.2d 890 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
145. Id. at 891.
146. 148 So.2d 540 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
147. 151 So.2d 866 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
148. Pentecost v. Ansan Corp., 136 So.2d 667 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
149. Crosier v. Joseph Abraham Ford Co., 150 So.2d 499 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963) (missing
tile in floor of common shower stall); Joskowitz v. Holtman, 134 So.2d 265 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1961) (overlapping carpet runner in apartment hallway).
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In two cases, slips and falls caused by foreign substances on the
floors of grocery stores resulted in judgments for the defendants. In one,
the plaintiff slipped and fell on a grape. The storekeeper was held not
liable in the absence of evidence showing how the substance came to be
on the floor, how long it had been there, and whether it had been dropped
on the floor by an employee or a customer.' ° Similarly, an interval of five
seconds from the time a jar of baby food fell from one customer's cart
and broke on the floor to the plaintiff's fall was insufficient to prove that
the storekeeper was liable for maintaining a dangerous condition or for
failure to warn the plaintiff of the hazard.151 Conversely, however, a sum-
mary judgment for a defendant hotel was reversed where the plaintiff
alleged that her fall was caused by the raised edge of a large rug in the
hotel lobby." 2
In Sadowsky v. Levine, 5 ' the plaintiff was injured as the result of a
defective rubber mat placed in a common hallway of an apartment build-
ing. In affirming the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, the court
held that in the absence of a specific allegation of the lessor's knowledge
of the dangerous condition and of facts to establish the period of time
during which the condition existed in order to show that the landlord
had an opportunity to discover the defect, the complaint was defective.
In another case involving a defective mat,"' a judgment for the
plaintiff was affirmed on the grounds that a jury question was properly
presented as to whether the landlord was negligent in permitting dirt to
accumulate under a mat on a tile floor.
A landlord who has undertaken to keep leased premises in repair
may be liable to third persons if he has actual or constructive notice of
a defect. 5" In Goldstein v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.," 6 the plain-
tiff was injured when she tripped over a metal reinforcing rod which pro-
truded from a concrete car stop in the store parking lot. A judgment for
the defendant-owner was affirmed when the plaintiff failed to prove either
knowledge on the part of the landlord or circumstances from which
notice might be implied.
A summary judgment in favor of the landlord was reversed, however,
in Berlin v. Southgate Corp.'5' The plaintiff, a guest of one of the tenants,
150. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Manning, 143 So.2d 339 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962); accord,
Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Trusell, 131 So.2d 730 (Fla. 1961), reversing, 122 So.2d 616 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1960) (Lettuce on Floor).
151. Waters v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 146 So.2d 577 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
152. Rothenberg v. Leevans Corp., 155 So.2d 839 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
153. 135 So.2d 776 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
154. Kaufman v. Sweet Et Al. Corp., 144 So.2d 515 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
155. Butler v. Mancy, 146 Fla. 33, 200 So. 226 (1941); Wiley v. Dow, 107 So.2d 166
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1958); Moore v. O'Connor, 106 So.2d 606 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
156. 142 So.2d 115 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
157. 142 So.2d 362 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
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was injured when she tripped over an aluminum framing installed in the
hallway of the building. The appellate court held that since the plaintiff
had used the hallway many times on previous occasions, a material issue
of fact was presented as to whether the owner and contractor were negli-
gent in failing to warn of the installation of the framing pursuant to in-
stalling a glass panel and door in the hallway.
In another case,15 8 the terrazzo floor of a stall shower had been
-treated with a commercial solvent which, if not completely removed after
cleansing, dried to form an invisible film which became very slippery
when wet. The plaintiff testified that after adjusting the water temperature
and without moving, her feet slipped out from under her. A judgment non
obstant verdicto for the defendant was reversed and reinstatement of the
jury verdict for the plaintiff was ordered. The court held that a jury ques-
tion is presented when evidence shows 'that there was an invisible sub-
stance on the floor which caused the person to fall, notwithstanding the
fact that under Florida law a party who, without explanation, slips on a
floor, may not recover.
B. Distribution of Gas and.Electricity
The distribution of gas and electricity has been classified as an ac-
tivity highly dangerous to life and property and a distributor thereof must
exercise a degree of care commensurate with the dangerous character of
its product. This duty extends not only to the distributor's customers,
but also to those members of the public who might be injured as a result of
the distribution.
In Farber v. Houston Corp.,' 9 a gas explosion occurred in a bath-
room in the plaintiff's store. The store did not have gas service but other
tenants of the building did. In some manner, gas had leaked into the
store and the bathroom. When the plaintiff turned on the light, a spark
ignited the accumulated gas and the explosion occurred. The defense's
assertion was that investigation had disclosed a leak under the pavement
in front of the store, which had been caused by a crack in the pipeline.
The trial court refused to admit testimony relating to the company's
knowledge of prior gas leaks in its system and directed a verdict for the
defendant. On appeal, the case was reversed and remanded. The court
held that evidence 'tending to show knowledge or notice of seepage or gas
leaks was clearly relevant and raised a jury question as to whether the
company "as the purveyor of a dangerous commodity, exercised that de-
gree of care commensurate with such known danger."' 10
158. Fritts v. Collins, 144 So.2d 850 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962); and see e.g., S. H. Kress
and Co. v. Telford, 240 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1957); J. C. Penny Co. v. Campbell, 325 P.2d
1056 (Okla. 1958); First Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wylie, 46 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1950)
(waxed floor).
159. 150 So.2d 732 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
160. Id. at 734.
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In Kerben v. Florida Power & Light Co., 6' the plaintiff was burned
severely when a fifteen-foot television antenna touched a live uninsulated
power line as he lowered the antenna over a parapet wall from the roof of
a building. The power lines were about three feet below the roof level and
ten feet away from the side of the building. A summary judgment for the
defendant company was affirmed on the ground that the plaintiff was
contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
A directed verdict for the defendant was reversed, however, in Guh-
man v. Florida Power & Light Co.,"6 2 in which the plaintiff was injured
when the crane he was operating came in contact with a live power line.
C. Doctor-Patient
The effect of the "locality rule"16 upon a doctor's liability for mal-
practice was the crucial issue in two cases. As a result of those decisions,
the rule now appears to be losing much of its significance in Florida law.
In the usual case, the rule is invoked to bar a plaintiff from using
experts from another community to establish malpractice in his commu-
nity. In Couch v. Hutchison, 164 however, the rule was invoked against the
defendant, an osteopathic orthopedic surgeon. He had performed a spinal
fusion upon the plaintiff by means of surgical screws, in accordance with
the method of his school of medicine. The plaintiff became dissatisfied with
the results of the operation and sought other medical aid. A second opera-
tion was performed by a medical orthopedic surgeon. The screws were re-
moved and the fusion accomplished by means of live bone grafts. The
plaintiff used as experts three medical orthopedic surgeons from the west
coast area of Florida. Although all three agreed that a spinal fusion was
necessary, they disagreed with the method employed by the defendant,
who was -the only osteopathic orthopedic surgeon .practicing in the area.
The only other qualified witness was in Miami and was not available at the
time of the trial. The defendant sought to introduce the evidence of a
doctor from the Philadelphia College of Osteopathy that the operation
had been performed properly in accordance with the method of spinal
fusion which the defendant had been taught at the school. Objections to
the expert's testimony was sustained by the trial court on the grounds that
the witness was not licensed to practice medicine in Florida and was not
familiar with orthopedic standards which prevail in St. Petersburg and
similar surrounding communities. In reversing a judgment for the plaintiff,
161. 134 So.2d 280 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
162. 139 So.2d 749 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963); see Ahearn v. Florida Power & Light Co.,
129 So.2d 457 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Barrs, 127 So.2d 896
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1961); McCollum v. Florida Power & Light Co., 125 So.2d 754 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1961) ; Bell v. Florida Power & Light Co., 106 So.2d 224 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
163. The "locality rule" in a malpractice case is applied to confine expert medical
testimony to that which can be given by doctors who practice in the same community.
164. 135 So.2d 18 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
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the appellate court noted that the reasons for the locality rule have, for
the most part, disappeared with the advent of modern transportation and
communication facilities and that its function is to define a minimum or
average standard of reasonable care required of a practitioner. By apply-
ing it in the instant case, the defendant was deprived of any expert testi-
mony concerning the approved standards of his school. Therefore, the
court held, "whatever may be the ultimate place of the locality rule in our
juridicial system . .. it can not be used to exclude evidence of the
defendant's ... qualifications with respect to the school in which he was
trained."' 65
The same issue arose again in its normal context in a case in which
the plaintiffs offered to present the expert testimony of a Miami physician
to show negligence in the procedures used in an operation performed by a
West Palm Beach physician. 6 The testimony was rejected on the grounds
of the locality rule and a summary judgment was entered for the de-
fendant. In reversing and remanding the case for trial, the court again
noted that the modern trend was toward expansion of the rule to include
the testimony of medical experts from the same or similar locality." 7 The
court then took judicial notice of the fact that Miami is a community at
least similar ,to West Palm Beach. Thus, the locality rule appears to be
losing all significance except in those cases occurring in remote areas
which differ significantly from the more populated urban and suburban
communities.
In Michaels v. Spiers,168 the court held, that affidavits by lay persons
and a copy of hospital records submitted on behalf of the plaintiff were
sufficient to preclude a summary judgment. A material issue of fact was
presented as to whether the trauma of initial injury, or the cast applied
by the defendant physician caused gangrene and the resultant amputa-
tion of the plaintiff's leg.
D. Manufacturers and Suppliers
The privity requirement'69 necessary to maintain an action of im-
plied warranty was the predominant issue involved in McBurnette v. Play-
ground Equipment Corp."7 The plaintiff's father, on behalf of his three
165. Id. at 23.
166. Cook v. Lichtblau, 144 So.2d 312 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
167. E.g., Kolesar v. United States, 198 F. Supp. 517 (S.D. Fla. 1961); Montgomery
v. Stary, 84 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1955) (dicta) ; McGulpin v. Bessmer, 241 Iowa 1119, 43
N.W.2d 121 (1950); Cavallaro v. Sharp, 121 A.2d 669 (R.I. 1956); Morrill v. Komasinski,
256 Wis. 417, 41 N.W.2d 620 (1950); 8 A.L.R.2d 772; Note, 12 U. FLA. L. REV. 121 (1959).
168. 144 So.2d 835 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
169. "One who is not in privity with a retailer has no action against him for breach
of an implied warranty." Carter v. Hector Supply Co., 128 So.2d 390, 393 (Fla. 1961)
(concurring opinion) (no liability to employee of purchaser for injuries caused by latent
defect in a riding sulky).
170. 137 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1963), affirming, 130 So.2d 117 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
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year old child and on his own behalf, sought to recover damages for the
loss of the child's finger when it was cut by the sharp edge of playground
equipment which the father had purchased. The complaint, based upon
negligence and implied warranty, was dismissed for failure to state a
cause of action. The district court of appeal reversed in part on the
grounds that the complaint was sufficient to state a cause of action in
negligence. The supreme court reversed, holding that although privity in
an implied warranty action against a retailer still is required in Florida,
the instant case constituted one of the exceptions to the rule. When the
plaintiff is a "naturally intended and reasonably contemplated beneficiary
of the warranty of fitness for use or merchantability implied by law,...
he stands in the shoes of the purchaser in enforcing the warranty.''
A judgment for the manufacturer was affirmed in Morton v. Hard-
wick Stove Co.,72 in which the plaintiff was injured when a gas stove in
her apartment exploded. Evidence of experiments performed on -the stove
by the plaintiff's expert was held properly to have been excluded by the
trial court because of the great dissimilarity between the pressure used
at the point of explosion and the pressure used in the plaintiff's experi-
ments.
17
E. Invitees, Licensees and Trespassers
1. INJURIES INVOLVING FALLS
In a case of first impression,'174 a person visiting a patient in a hospital
was classified as an invitee,'17 and the court affirmed a judgment for the
plaintiff for injuries sustained at night when she stepped into a large
pothole in the defendant's driveway.
Similarly, a pedestrian who is forced by the actions of the landowner
to deviate from his proper course in using a sidewalk and to use the
171. Id. at 566. The UmNIoaM COMMERCIAL CODE provides in section 2-318 that seller's
warranties cover any person who is in the family or household of the buyer, if it is reasonable
to expect that such person may use, consume, or be affected by the goods. E.g., Chapman v.
Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961) (niece burned by inflammable hula skirt pur-
chased by her aunt); Lindroth v. Walgreen Co., 329 Ill. App. 105, 67 N.E.2d 595 (1946)
(infant injured by a vaporizer purchased by his mother) ; Twombley v. Fuller Brush Co.,
221 Md. 476, 158 A.2d 110 (1960) (husband injured by spot remover purchased by wife) ;
Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953) (child burned
by inflammable cowboy suit).
172. 138 So.2d 807 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
173. The pressure used in the experiments to locate leaks was five to six times as
great as that used in the apartment gas service. See Hisler v. State, 52 Fla. 30, 42 So. 692
(1906); Huff v. Belcastro, 127 So.2d 476 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961); 2 JoNEs, EVIDENCE 867
(5th ed. 1958).
174. North Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Adams, 143 So.2d 355 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
175. E.g., Hamlet v. Troxler, 235 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1956) ; Cohen v. General Hosp.
Soc. of Connecticut, 113 Conn. 188, 154 At. 435 (1931) ; Desmond v. State of New York,
4 Misc. 2d 6, 158 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1956); Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati v. Duelius, 123
Ohio St. 52, 173 N.E. 737 (1930). But see contra: Field v. Sisters of Mercy of Colorado,
126 Colo. 1, 245 P.2d 1167 (1952).
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abutting land is an implied invitee."' The defendant service station owner
had blocked the sidewalk with a parked truck and the plaintiff, while
walking around the truck, slipped and fell on a patch of oil on the defend-
ant's property.
On the other hand, a pedestrian who tripped over a weighing machine
which was placed approximately three inches from the public sidewalk
in front of defendant's store was held to be a licensee, and a summary
judgment for the defendant was affirmed.177 The dissenting opinion ap-
pears to be more in accord with modern tort law in its statement that:
Where the premises adjoin a sidewalk or are so connected with
it to indicate a public use, the possessor .. . must use reasonable
care to see that there is no danger to those who through inad-
vertence or misleading demarcations, find themselves upon such
property.178
2. INJURIES NOT INVOLVING FALLS
In Canner v. Blank,'79 a thirteen year-old girl was injured when she
walked through a sliding glass door in a model home which she and her
parents were inspecting. The three panel sliding glass door which separated
the living room from the patio area bore no marking or decals. In reversing
a summary judgment for the defendant, the court held that a jury question
was presented as to the negligence of the defendant.
A homeowner was held liable for injuries sustained by his guest when
the latter stepped into a hole on the defendant's front lawn which had
been dug by the defendant's children. 80
F. Master-Servant
In a negligence action brought by an employee, an employer who
rejects the Florida Workmen's Compensation Law' 8' is precluded from
defending the suit by asserting the common law defenses of assumption
of the risk, contributory negligence or the fellow servant rule.' How-
ever, if the employer was completely free of the negligence which caused
or contributed to employee's injury, or if the injury resulted solely from
the employee's own negligence, he is not entitled to recover. 8'
176. Sandford v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 139 So.2d 916 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
177. Schroeder v. Grables Bakery, Inc., 149 So.2d 564 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963). "It does
not appear that public policy requires establishing a rule in Florida that property owners
are liable for reasonably foreseeable injuries to the traveling public who may stray from
an adjacent public way since to do so would in effect extend the same rule of liability to
the trespasser and the licensee as is not extended to invitees." Id. at 565. (Emphasis added.)
178. Id. at 565.
179. 152 So.2d 193 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
180. Lowery v. Rosenberg, 147 So.2d 321 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
181. FLA. STAT. ch. 440 (1963).
182. FLA. STAT. § 440.06 (1963).
183. Baker v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 212 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1954); Colton
v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 136 So.2d 361 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
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G. Defenses in Common Law Cases
1. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
A summary judgment based on the "two course doctrine"' 84 was
reversed when the record failed to indicate that the defendant knew or
should have known by the use of ordinary care that the course chosen
by him was likely to cause injury.85
Contributory negligence is a proper defense in those cases in which
the defendant's negligence consists of a violation of a statute that is not
designed to protect a class of persons from their inability to exercise care
for their own protection.'86
A father's contributory negligence bars his recovery of damages for
mental pain and suffering and loss of the child's services 1 7 under the
Florida wrongful death of minors act.'88
2. IMMUNITY
Local acts which require written notice within a specified time limit
as a condition precedent to tort claims against a municipality are valid
and not in violation of the equal protection provision of the constitution. 9
H. Res Ipsa Loquitur
The applicability of the doctrine was rejected in two cases. The first
involved a plaintiff whose arm was severely injured when a coin-operated
washing machine started as she was loading it.'9 ° The second case involved
a plaintiff who lost an eye when struck by a pebble thrown up by the
rear wheels of a truck in a parking lot. 9 '
I. Damages
The majority of cases involving the issue of damages dealt with the
usual questions of excessive or inadequate damages.
When one has notice or knowledge of a physical ailment that
necessitates the use of drugs which may impair his power -to control or
operate a motor vehicle, he is guilty of negligence to an extreme degree
184. The doctrine holds that one having a choice between two courses of conduct is
contributorily negligent as a matter of law in pursuing a course which is dangerous rather
than one which is safe where the ordinary prudent person would not have so chosen.
185. Foster v. Gulfstream Press, Inc., 134 So.2d 270 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
186. Richardson v. Fountain, 154 So.2d 709 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
187. Burch v. Gilbert, 148 So.2d 289 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
188. FLA. STAT. § 768.03 (1963).
189. McCann v. City of Lake Wales, 144 So.2d 505 (Fla. 1962).
190. Brookshire v. Florida Bendix Co., Inc., 153 So.2d 55 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
191. Smith's Bakery, Inc. v. Jernigan, 134 So.2d 519 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961).
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if he operates a vehicle while under the influence of these drugs. In such a
case, punitive damages presents a proper question for the jury. 9 2
In a case of first impression,' 93 the furnishing of hospital and medical
services to a serviceman without an obligation to repay them was held to
be a proper element of damages. Medical benefits received from a govern-
mental agency are now included within the "collateral source rule,"' 94
recognized with respect to insurance.
An administrator may recover for the loss of the prospective estate
of a minor. 95 The proper measure of damages is the present worth of the
decedent's life to an estimated prospective estate that he or she probably
would have earned and saved after reaching majority and during life ex-
pectancy.196 An award of 20,000 dollars for the death of an eight year-
old girl was held excessive when ,the only evidence relating to the dece-
dent's prospects of accumulating an estate was testimony by her mother
that she was physically attractive."' In determining the value of such a
prospective estate, the jury does not have an arbitrary discretion, but must
reasonably base its determination upon the decedent's age, mental capa-
city, sex, health, intelligence, status and other factors which affect a fair
judgment as 'to life expectancy, earning and saving capacity.
A bailee-for-hire, whose negligent operation of an automobile re-
sults in an action by a third party against the bailor, is required to
indemnify the bailor for reasonable attorney's fees expended in defense
of the action as part of the damages assessed against the bailor.'9 '
IV. OTHER COMMON LAW TORTS
A. In General
In an action for fraud and deceit in which the plaintiff paid money
to one defendant for an interest in a corporation which subsequently be-
came bankrupt, and all representations were made by the defendant
to whom the money was paid, the plaintiff could not recover for fraud
from another defendant who had made no representations.' 9
192. Busser v. Sabatasso, 143 So.2d 532 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962) (Defendant was taking
medication for a heart condition).
193. Paradis v. Thomas, 150 So.2d 457 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
194. E.g., Finley P. Smith, Inc. v. Schectman, 132 So.2d 460 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
See also, Sainsbury v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 183 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1950);
Burke v. Byrd, 188 F. Supp. 384 (N.D. Fla. 1960); 15 Am . JUR. Damages § 198 (1938);
25 C.J.S. Damages .§ 99 (1941); RESTATiwENT, Torts §§ 920, 924 (1938).
195. FLA. STAT. 768.01-2 (1963).
196. Florida East Coast R.R. v. Hayes, 67 Fla. 101, 64 So. 504 (1914).
197. Burch v. Gilbert, 148 So.2d 289 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963). See also Hooper Constr.
Co. v. Drake, 73 So.2d 279 (Fla. 1954) ($20,000 excessive for death of five year old);
Miami Dairy Farm, Inc. v. Tinsley, 115 Fla. 650, 155 So. 850 (1934) ($3,000 excessive for
a 10 year-old).
198. Fontainbleau Hotel Corp. v. Postol, 142 So.2d 299 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
199. Goodman v. Strassburg, 139 So.2d 163 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
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In Ramel v. Chasebrook Constr. Co.,200 the plaintiff purchased a new
home from the defendant. Shortly thereafter, the pool and patio began to
pull away from the foundation and the walls of the house developed large
cracks and bulges. Testimony was introduced at the trial by an engineer-
employee of the defendant to the effect that because the land was mucky,
he had advised his employer to utilize pilings prior to the construction of
the house, but that action pursuant to his advice was neglected by the
defendant-builder. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the de-
fendant-builder. On appeal, the case was reversed and remanded for a
new trial. The court held that upon the facts and testimony, a statement
by the builder that the house was well constructed was not an expression
of mere opinion or sales talk, but rather constituted an actionable mis-
representation since the defect was a latent one and the defendant had
superior knowledge, which imposed upon him the duty to disclose the
soil conditions.
In Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,210 the federal dis-
trict court held that under Florida law, the undue harrassment of a
debtor, 0 2 maygive rise to an action for invasion of privacy.203 The plaintiff
had purchased from the defendant four new tires and tubes on the install-
ment plan and was current in his payments. Without complaint or notice
to the plaintiff, the defendant removed all the tires and tubes from the
vehicle while it was located at the plaintiff's place of employment, a
country club parking lot. The vehicle was left standing on the rims of its
wheels in full view of fellow employees and country club members. The
court distinguished the Florida case of Cason v. Baskin,"4 which in a
dictum stated that the right to privacy was not violated by oral communi-
cation, on the grounds that the acts in 'the instant case amounted to a
demonstrative publication which was sufficiently communicated to a large
number of persons.
In Gleason v. Title Guar. Co., 205 a title examiner was held liable for
200. 135 So.2d 876 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961) ; see, e.g., Ashburn v. Miller, 161 Cal. App. 2d
71, 326 P.2d 229 (1958) ; Cohen v. Vivian, 14 Colo. 443, 349 P.2d 366 (1960) ; Bayou Rapides
Lumber Co. v. Davies, 221 La. 1099, 61 So.2d 885 (1952); Pinger v. Guaranty Investment
Co., 307 S.W.2d 53 (Mo. App. 1957); Wolford v. Freeman, 150 Neb. 537, 35 N.W.2d 98
(1948); Smith v. B. Fano, 330 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Civ. App 1959); Lincoln v. Pohly, 325
S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
201. 306 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1962).
202. The majority of jurisdictions recognize that oppressive treatment of a debtor
by a creditor in attempting to collect even a just debt may be an invasion of privacy,
e.g., Norriss v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 272 Ala. 174, 132 So.2d 321 (1960) ; Bowden v. Speigel,
Inc., 47 Cal. App. 2d 793, 216 P.2d 571; Biederman's of Springfield, Inc. v. Wright, 322
S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1959); Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340; Bennett v.
Norban, 396 Pa. 94, 151 A.2d 476 (1959).
203. Florida recognizes the right of privacy as a distinct tort. Cason v. Baskin, 155
Fla. 198, 20 So.2d 243 (1944), aff'd on rehearing, 159 Fla. 31, 30 So.2d 635 (1947).
204. Ibid.
205. 300 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1962).
TORTS
damages when various mortgages which he certified as first mortgages,
proved to be subordinate to other mortgages. In defense, the attorney
asserted the local custom of relying upon telephone information from an
abstract company, rather than examining the public records or a written
abstract. The court reasoned that while custom provides an important
indication of what constitutes reasonable care or negligence, all customs
are not good customs. "Lawyers have no prescriptive right to make
knowingly false statements in the name of custom. 'No degree of antiquity
can give sanction to a usage bad in itself.'
In N.A.A.C.P. v. Webb's City Inc.,2 7 the court upheld an injunction
against civil rights demonstrations, picketing and inducing a customer
boycott. The court weighed the plaintiff's interest in its business against
the defendants' interest in advancing their social objectives of ending
segregation and discrimination. The defendants' interests were held insuffi-
cient ,to overcome the interest of the plaintiff.
A summary judgment in favor of an attorney-defendant in a malprac-
tice suit was reversed. The attorney's negligence was held to raise a
genuine issue of material fact since the record did not show conclusively
that the personal injury suit, dismissed with prejudice, would have been
lost regardless of the alleged negligence. 0
A bowler was severely injured when he was struck on the head with a
bowling ball by a fellow bowler when the former "kidded" him about his
game. A summary judgment in favor of the bowling alley was reversed
on the ground that an issue of material fact was raised as to whether the
defendant knew or should have known of the tendency of the bowler to
assault other patrons while engaged in competitive bowling.20 9
Publication by a newspaper of progress docket entries which re-
flected the plaintiff's judicial commitment for addiction to narcotics, con-
stituted an unlawful invasion of privacy under section 398.18(1) of the
Florida statutes.210
206. Id. at 814, citing Leach v. Three of the Kings Messengers, 19 How. St. Trials 1027
(1725).
207. 152 So.2d 179 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963) ; Note, 18 U. MIAmi L. REV. 488 (1963).
208. Suritz v. Kelner, 134 So.2d 259 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
209. Nance v. Ball, 134 So.2d 35 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961). As to the duty of a business
establishment to exercise reasonable care to maintain the premises in a safe condition and
to guard against subjecting patrons to dangers known or which reasonably might have
been foreseen, see McNulty v. Hurley, 97 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1957); Gordon v. Hotel Seville,
105 So.2d 175 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
210. The statute provides for voluntary commitment for treatment of narcotic addicts,
and that all records shall be open to inspection only to the person named or his counsel or
narcotic officers. See also FLA. STAT. § 794.03 (1963), which prohibits publication of the
name of any female who is raped or assaulted with an intent to commit rape and FLA.
STAT. § 72.27 (1963) which requires the clerks to index adoption proceedings only in the
names of the petitioner%.
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B. Libel and Slander
A complaint alleging that a newspaper editorial which charged
by innuendo and inference that a city commissioner, by hiring incompetent
workers for city jobs was in effect cheating the taxpayers, was held suffi-
cient to allege libel per se.21' Conversely, a news story relating to an
alleged seizure by the Internal Revenue of a councilman's pay checks in
order to satisfy liens was held not libelous per se and the complaint was
properly dismissed."1
Allegations in a complaint that the defendant had communicated
statements to newspaper reporters which were later published, that the
plaintiff was "just about the most dishonest person I know," that the
plaintiff was "foul-mouthed," and "that the plaintiff had been 'dishonest'
in giving testimony before a Florida legislative committee, ' 21 3 were suffi-
cient to state a cause of action.
C. Malicious Prosecution and False Arrest
In a case of first impression, 21 a complaint alleging the malicious
prosecution of a malicious prosecution suit was held sufficient to state
a cause of action.
A judgment for the defendant-city in a false arrest case was affirmed
in Giblin v. City of Coral Gables.215 The supreme court held that when a
police officer stops a motorist, an apprehension is effected which is suffi-
cient to be considered an arrest. Thus, the subsequent recapture of the
plaintiff outside the corporate limits of the city was proper under section
901.22 of the Florida statutes, authorizing an officer to take a party into
custody if pursuant to immediate pursuit.
In Fisher v. Maas Brothers, Inc.,1 6 the plaintiff was convicted in a
municipal court on a worthless check charge. Within an hour, the trial
judge recalled the plaintiff and dismissed the charge. The initial conviction
was held to raise a presumption of probable cause sufficient to preclude a
suit for malicious prosecution.
211. Hevey v. News-Journal Corp., 148 So.2d 543 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
212. McCormick v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 139 So.2d 197 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
213. Fiore v. Rogero, 144 So.2d 99, 100 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
214. Hopke v. O'Byrne, 148 So.2d 755 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963). The essential elements of
a suit for malicious prosecution are as follows:
(1) The commencement or continuance of an original criminal or civil judicial
proceeding. (2) Its legal'causation by the present defendant against plaintiff who
was defendant in the original proceeding. (3) Its bona fide termination in favor
of the present plaintiff. (4) The absence of probable cause for such proceeding.
(5) The presence of malice therein. (6) Damage conforming to legal standards
resulting to plaintiff. If any one of these elements is lacking, the result is fatal to
the action. Id. at 756 citing Tatum Bros. v. Watson, 92 Fla. 278, 109 So. 623 (1926).
215. 149 So.2d 561 (Fla. 1963), affirming, 127 So.2d 914 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
216. 149 So.2d 910 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963). The action of a committing magistrate in
binding over a party raises a presumption of probable cause in Florida. Gallucci v. Milavico,
100 So.2d 375 (Fla. 1958). This rule is contrary to other authorities.
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V. LEGISLATION
In the only significant legislation during the survey period, the
Florida wrongful death of minors act was amended to include actions ex
contractu as well as ex delicto.217
217. FLA. STAT. § 168.03 (1963).
